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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-3(2) (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Because Scott Ockey ("Mr. Ockey") has complicated this appeal by raising 8 
separate issues and discussing claims dismissed 6 years ago, John Lehmer 
("Mr. Lehmer") will provide some context before stating the issues. In 1997, Mr. Ockey 
filed 25 claims against 14 members of his family, a family whose decisions concerning 
the development of a family ranch had made Mr. Ockey more than $2 million at the time 
of trial (and will make him more than $11 million) through no effort of his own. (R. 3-
47; TT^IO-M.) Just before trial, Mr. Ockey dismissed his claims against most family 
members, leaving only two claims—conversion and breach of fiduciary duty—against his 
cousin, Mr. Lehmer, and one claim—conversion—against a family-owned company, Iron 
Mountain Alliance, Inc. ("IMAI"). (R. 4591.) Mr. Ockey also waived his right to 
damages, electing instead to pursue a single equitable remedy: Return of some stock 
issued by IMAI, allegedly wrongfully withheld from Mr. Ockey. (R. 4592; TT: 1045-47.) 
After trial, the court ruled that (i) the conversion claims were barred by the statute 
of limitations; (ii) Mr. Ockey had ratified the stock transfers forming the basis of his 
claims by accepting $2 million in benefits after becoming aware of the transfers; and 
(iii) Mr. Ockey's equitable remedy is unavailable because the allegedly converted stock 
no longer exists, or at least Mr. Lehmer does not possess it, and therefore it cannot be 
returned. (R. 4603-05.) Mr. Ockey appeals not only these rulings, but also the previous 
dismissal of his claim to quiet title in a portion of the developed ranch property, title to 
which Mr. Ockey waived any future claim in a 1998 settlement agreement. (R. 1162.) 
Issue 1: Mr. Lehmer has never claimed title to the interest in the real property that 
1
 Because there is not a record number assigned to the 5 volumes of trial transcript, 
Mr. Lehmer will refer to the 5 volumes as "TT," followed by the transcript page number. 
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is the subject of Mr. Ockey's quiet title and declaratory judgment actions, both of which 
rest upon the same legal theory and seek the same remedy. 
The issue is whether under the quiet title statute one can maintain a quiet title 
action against a party who has never claimed title to the subject real property. 
Standard of Review: Questions of statutory interpretation and standing are 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859-60 (Utah 1995); 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). 
Issue 2: In his quiet title and declaratory judgment claims, Mr. Ockey originally 
named defendants claiming title to his asserted interest in real property—Iron Mountain 
Holding Group, L.C. ("IMHG") and Iron Mountain Associates, L.L.C. ("IMALLC")— 
but in 1998, Mr. Ockey entered into a settlement agreement in which he acknowledged he 
had transferred any interest he had in the real property to his company, OK Investments, 
Inc., and had agreed title could irrevocably vest in IMALLC '"to the same extent as would 
have occurred if the Litigation never had been filed and did not exist." (R. 1162.) 
The issue is whether quiet title claims are moot where a plaintiff has 
acknowledged that he transferred any interest he had to a separate company and agreed 
another company can retain title no matter how the quiet-title claims are adjudicated. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews issues of mootness for correctness. See 
Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119, ^8, 977 P.2d 1218. 
Issue 3: Just before trial, Mr. Ockey waived his right to recover damages and 
elected the sole equitable remedy of return of some stock issued by IMAI, which 
Mr. Ockey claims was wrongfully withheld from him in 1993. The IMAI stock 
Mr. Lehmer owns today is different stock, and therefore, the trial court ruled that 
ordering Mr. Lehmer to give his stock to Mr. Ockey would be to award a type of 
damages, a remedy expressly waived by Mr. Ockey. 
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The issue is whether ordering a defendant to return stock different from, and much 
more valuable than, the stock allegedly taken is an equitable remedy, or instead 
constitutes a type of damages. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the availability of an equitable remedy 
for correctness. See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1040 (Utah 1995). 
Issue 4: The alleged conversion of stock occurred on June 30, 1993, but Mr. 
Ockey did not file his complaint until June 19, 1997. By early 1994, Mr. Ockey—a 
former stock broker with a business degree—knew about the 1993 stock transfers 
forming the basis of his conversion claims and was encouraged to review, and given 
access to, IMAI records to address any concerns he had. (R. 4598.) 
The issue is whether a conversion claim is barred by the three-year statute of 
limitations where within months of the alleged conversion, a sophisticated plaintiff 
becomes aware of the stock transfers that form the basis of his claim and is encouraged, 
and provided the means to, investigate the transfers, and yet fails to object, let alone file 
suit, until nearly four years after the alleged conversion. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews whether the statute of limitations bars a 
claim for correctness. See Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, If 19, 144 P.3d 1129. 
Issue 5: Mr. Ockey learned of the 1993 stock transfers forming the basis of his 
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims within months of the transfers, but instead 
of challenging them he participated fully in the family business and accepted more than 
$2 million in benefits made possible by the 1993 stock transfers. The trial court found 
Mr. Ockey therefore had ratified any defect in the stock transfers. 
The issue is whether a plaintiff ratifies stock transfers where the plaintiff has 
knowledge of the transfers, does not object to the transfers, and accepts over $2 million in 
benefits made possible by the allegedly wrongful stock transfers. 
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Standard of Review: The Court reviews a trial court's factual findings for clear 
error and its application of the doctrine of ratification to those facts for correctness. See 
State v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
Cross Appeal Issue: As discussed in Issue 3, the trial court ruled that because the 
stock currently owned by Mr. Lehmer is not the same stock allegedly wrongfully 
withheld, ordering Mr. Lehmer to give his stock to Mr. Ockey would be to award a type 
of damages, a remedy expressly waived by Mr. Ockey. The trial court reached this 
conclusion after first ruling that Mr. Ockey had "no adequate remedy at law" because the 
stock could not be valued as of 1993. (R. 4603.) Mr. Ockey provided no evidence that 
the stock could not be valued as of 1993 (when the alleged conversion occurred) or early 
1994 (when Mr. Ockey discovered the alleged conversion). (R. TT:862-67.) 
The issue is whether a plaintiff must first show no remedy at law exists before he 
can elect the equitable remedy of return of allegedly converted stock which is much more 
valuable at the time the complaint was filed than it was at the time he discovered the 
alleged conversion. This issue was preserved at R. TT:1002, 1011-14. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the availability of an equitable remedy 
for correctness. See Thurston v. Box Elder County. 892 P.2d 1034, 1040 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISION 
A statement included in the articles of incorporation that "the 
corporation elects to have preemptive rights," or words of 
similar import, means that the following principles apply 
except to the extent the articles of incorporation expressly 
provide otherwise: 
There is no preemptive right with respect to: 
(i) shares issued as compensation for services to 
directors, officers, agents, or employees of the 
corporation, its subsidiaries, or affiliates . . . . 
Utah Code Ann § 16-10a-630(2)(c) (1992). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Trial Court 
Scott Ockey ("Mr. Ockey") filed his complaint on June 19, 1997, alleging 25 
different claims against 14 members of his family and 3 family companies. (R. 3-47.) 
John Lehmer ("Mr. Lehmer") will not recite the history of each of these claims because 
(i) just before trial Mr. Ockey dismissed his claims against all but two defendants— 
Mr. Lehmer and Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. ("IMAI")—and (ii) in his opening brief 
Mr. Ockey appeals from rulings concerning only four of his original claims: quiet title, 
declaratory judgment, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. (R. 4591.) 
On December 27, 2000, Mr. Ockey filed his third amended complaint, which 
outlines the four causes of action discussed in the opening brief. (R. 2660.) The first 
cause of action is for a declaratory judgment that title to an undivided interest in certain 
real property (the 2,642-acre family ranch) vested in Mr. Ockey on September 6, 1986, 
and that "all subsequent attempts to convey" the portion of real property his interest 
represented were void. (R. 2642-43.) The second cause of action is to quiet title in the 
same portion of real property under the same theory.2 (R. 2643-44.) 
On February 15, 2001, the trial court dismissed both claims because Mr. Ockey 
had ratified the conveyance of whatever interest in real property he may have been 
entitled to when he entered into a 1998 settlement agreement with some of the original 
defendants. (R. 3748.) In the settlement agreement, Mr. Ockey agreed one of those 
defendants—Iron Mountain Associates, L.L.C. ("IMALLC")—could retain title to 
Mr. Ockey's interest as if this case "never had been filed and did not exist." (R. 3748; 
1162.) Prior to entering into the settlement agreement, Mr. Ockey had (as did all other 
family members) transferred any interest he had in the real property to various family 
2
 Because these two causes of action are identical, and Mr. Ockey never explains how 
they might differ, Mr. Lehmer will consider them a single quiet title claim. 
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companies, first in 1994 to Iron Mountain Alliance, Ltd. ("IMALTD"), later in 1994 to 
Iron Mountain Holding Group, L.C. ("IMHG"), and finally in 1995 to IMALLC, 
transfers for which Mr. Ockey will be paid more than $11 million, of which $2 million 
had be paid by the time of trial. (R. 3748; TT:564, 710-14.) 
On January 16-24, 2002, the parties tried to an advisory jury the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against Mr. Lehmer and the conversion claims against both 
Mr. Lehmer and IMAI. (R. 4442-43.) By the time of trial, the basis of each claim was 
identical, as was the remedy sought. The basis of Mr. Ockey's claims was his allegation 
that on June 30, 1993, Mr. Lehmer, on behalf of IMAI, wrongfully withheld from 
Mr. Ockey certain IMAI stock. (Opening Brief at 19; R. TT: 1016-17; R. 2645 at % 119.) 
And the only remedy Mr. Ockey sought was return of that stock. (R. 4592.) 
The issues narrowed to involve only the alleged stock conversion and a single 
equitable remedy through a number of strategic decisions made by Mr. Ockey. First, 
after Mr. Ockey's damages expert could not place a high value on the stock as of 1993, 
Mr. Ockey decided to waive his right to damages, to elect only an equitable remedy, and 
to request a bench trial.3 (R. 4592.) Second, to avoid having a jury decide his case, just 
before trial Mr. Ockey dismissed his claims against all defendants except Mr. Lehmer 
and IMAI. (R. 4591.) Third, when presenting his case at trial, Mr. Ockey offered no 
evidence of damages, thereby cementing his waiver of damages and election of only an 
equitable remedy. (R. 4556; 4592; TT: 1045-47.) 
On October 15, 2002, the trial court found in favor of Mr. Lehmer and IMAI on all 
claims. (R. 4555-59.) Specifically, the trial court ruled that the equitable remedy sought 
by Mr. Ockey was unavailable as to Mr. Lehmer because requiring Mr. Lehmer, an 
individual, to give Mr. Ockey his own stock—which is not he same stock allegedly 
3
 The jury was therefore only advisory, as all parties eventually consented to the trial 
court determining all issues of liability and the proper remedy, if any. (R. 4991-92.) 
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wrongfully withheld from Mr. Ockey in 1993—is not an equitable remedy but instead is 
a type of damages, a remedy expressly waived by Mr. Ockey.4 (R. 4557-58.) The trial 
court then ruled that Mr. Ockey's conversion claims were not filed within the three-year 
statute of limitations and the statute of limitations was not tolled by the discovery rule 
because Mr. Ockey "knew or had reason to know of the events giving rise to a conversion 
claim within the three years." (R. 4558-59; 4599.) The trial court also ruled that even if 
the conversion claims had been brought within the three-year statute of limitations, 
Mr. Ockey ratified the stock transfers forming the basis of his claims by accepting over 
$2 million in benefits after learning of the 1993 stock transfers. (R. 4559.) 
On June 6, 2003, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Lehmer and 
IMAI, awarding them costs in amounts to be determined. (R. 4613.) On July 2, 2003, 
Mr. Ockey filed a notice of appeal, an appeal which was summarily dismissed by the 
Utah Court of Appeals on December 18, 2003, due to the unresolved issue of costs. 
(R. 4636-37; 4694-95.) On February 27, 2006, the trial court entered an amended 
judgment, awarding Mr. Lehmer $4,338.45 and IMAI $1,372.32 as the prevailing parties. 
(R. 4728.) Mr. Ockey appeals from this final judgment. 
On March 2,2006, Mr. Lehmer filed a cross appeal on the sole issue of whether 
the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Ockey did not have an adequate remedy at 
law. (R. 4735-36.) This issue is important only as an alternative ground to affirm, but is 
itself a sufficient basis to conclude Mr. Ockey is not entitled to equitable relief. 
II. Statement of Facts 
Before his death in 1969, John G. Condas had homesteaded or otherwise acquired 
nearly 2700 acres in Summit County, located between what would eventually become 
4
 Contrary to Mr. Ockey's suggestion, the trial court's ruling was not a directed verdict, 
(Opening Brief at 5), but instead was based upon detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law entered after all parties had waived the right to require the last witness 
to finish testifying at trial. (R. 4192.) 
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The Canyons and Park City ski resorts (the "Ranch"). (R. 4593.) Upon his death, John 
Condas conveyed the Ranch in undivided 1/6 interests to each of his six children, George 
Condas, Ellen Condas Bayas, Nick Condas, Alexandra Condas Ockey, Chris Condas, and 
Mary Condas Lehmer (the "Siblings"). (R. 4593.) Alexandra Condas (a defendant in 
this case until one week before trial) is the mother of Mr. Ockey, and Mary Condas 
Lehmer (who died October 17, 1987) was the mother of Mr. Lehmer. (R. 4369; TT:517.) 
Because the Siblings' interests in the Ranch were undivided, it became their 
practice to come to consensus for every decision involving the Ranch, including, for 
example, entering into various grazing leases during the 1970s and 1980s and declining 
an offer by the Boyer Company in the 1980s to acquire the Ranch. (R. TT:233-34, 920-
30, 948.) Instead of holding formal meetings, the Siblings had a "family communicator," 
Nick Condas ("Uncle Nick"), whose practice was to visit every Sibling's house nearly 
five times per week to discuss any family business and obtain any needed consent. 
(R. 4594; TT:131, 416-17, 570, 811-12, 818, 829, 896, 920-26.) Uncle Nick was perfect 
for this job because he (i) was not married and had no children of his own to raise, 
(ii) was highly intelligent (a measured IQ of 212), (iii) was financially secure from 
having worked for the State Department for a number of years, and (iv) got along with 
everyone he met, including Mr. Ockey, who lived with Uncle Nick almost continuously 
from the mid-80s until just before he filed this lawsuit. (R. TT:263, 349, 811-13.) The 
developers of the Ranch later described Uncle Nick as a "clearinghouse of information;" 
and Siblings testified Uncle Nick had their "authority to make decisions with respect to 
the [R]anch," as he "was honest and . . . generous." (R. TT:635, 703, 814.) 
A. The Trusts 
By 1976, the Siblings realized that the Ranch might be lost through estate taxes, as 
there likely would be insufficient funds to pay such taxes if one of the Siblings were to 
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die, and therefore, the Siblings conveyed all but 104 acres of the Ranch to irrevocable 
trusts established for the benefit of their children, nephews, and nieces (the 
"Grandchildren"), including Mr. Ockey. (R. 4593; TT:533-34.) Mr. Ockey had two 
trusts, one established by his mother, Alexandra Ockey, which included 1/12 undivided 
interest in the Ranch; and the other established by Uncle Nick as a gift to Mr. Ockey, 
which included 1/18 undivided interest in the Ranch (the "Trusts"). (R. 4593; TT:556.) 
By 1983, when Mr. Ockey graduated from the University of Utah with a business 
and finance degree, he was aware of his ownership interest in the Ranch, as he had 
(i) been told about the Trusts by his mother, (ii) expressly extended one of the Trusts in 
1979 when he turned 21 years old; and (iii) had told his sister, Ellen Ockey, the Ranch 
was "worth $30 million and it's ours, all ours." (R. TT:839,232, 227-28, 559.) When 
Mr. Ockey turned 28 years old on September 6, 1986, his undivided interests in the 
Ranch vested. (R. 2326-43.) At this point, had Mr. Ockey demanded his portion of the 
Ranch be divided, then under paragraph 4.q. of the Trusts the trustee would have had the 
option to divide the Ranch itself or to compensate Mr. Ockey "in money." (R. 2332, 
2339.) Mr. Ockey did not demand a portion of the Ranch until he filed his complaint in 
1997, after Mr. Ockey had transferred his interest to different family-owned companies, 
transfers for which Mr. Ockey has been paid millions of dollars. (R. 3-47; TT:215.) 
B. The R&J Attempted Development 
In 1989, Hank Rothwell and Jerry Jackson ("R&J") wanted to develop a ski resort 
by combining the Ranch with 505 acres ("State Lands") they had leased from the State of 
Utah ("State Lease"). (R. 4594-95; T:86-87, 216, 235-37.) Mr. Ockey, along with other 
family members, attended a meeting with R&J at which the family decided to enter into 
an Option to Ground Lease ("Option Agreement") with R&J's company, a company that 
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would become IMAI.5 (R. T235-36.) Each family member, including Mr. Ockey, was a 
lessor under the Option Agreement, which required IMAI 1o pay $30,000 per year 
("Option Consideration") collectively to the lessors. (R. 3416; 4594; TT:941.) 
Because it was too burdensome to obtain the signature of each Sibling and 
Grandchild for every decision concerning R&J's development plans, each family 
member—including Mr. Ockey—decided Mr. Lehmer (an attorney) would serve as 
"Lessors' Representative" for the family. (R. 4594.) As Lessor Representative, 
Mr. Lehmer was the "official recipient of all payments of Option Consideration and all 
notices under the Option Agreement." (R. 3288; 4594-95.) In addition, as outlined in the 
Option Agreement, each family member—including Mr. Ockey—signed a power of 
attorney agreement giving Mr. Lehmer "the authority to act on [their] behalf in all 
matters requiring [their] consent, cooperation, or assistance under the Option 
[Agreement].'5 (R. 3452; 4595-96; TT:90, 115.) These documents did not obligate 
Mr. Lehmer to make any particular asset distribution. (R. 4595.) 
After making the first two payments under the Option Agreement, R&J began 
having financial problems. (R. TT:941.) IMAI failed to make two $30,000 payments, 
something Mr. Ockey was aware of in 1992. (R. TT:257-58.) Instead of declaring a 
default, however, Mr. Lehmer, after Uncle Nick had obtained consent from family 
members, decided to forgive these payments if R&J would agree to pledge IMAI stock as 
collateral for future payments, which they did. (R. TT:93-95.) IMAI never made another 
payment under the Option Agreement, and on June 30,1993, R&J resigned from the 
IMAI board of directors and delivered all IMAI stock to Mr. Lehmer. (R. TT:98-100.) 
5
 Although not relevant to this appeal, the 1989 Option Agreement was with Iron 
Mountain Resort Corporation, which became Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc. in 1992. 
(R. TT:86-87.) 
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C. The IMAI Stock Transfers 
At the time R&J delivered the IMAI stock to Mr. Lehmer, the only asset owned by 
IMAI was the State Lease, and a $6,000 annual lease payment was past due. (R. 4596.) 
The State Lease was important to any future development of the Ranch because the State 
Lands were interspersed within the Ranch, and therefore IMAI needed to raise funds 
quickly to make the payment under the State Lease. (R. 4595.) While neither the power-
of-attorney agreements nor the Option Agreement required Mr. Lehmer to obtain consent 
from the lessors, he consulted with Uncle Nick before deciding how to proceed. 
(R. 4596.) Uncle Nick, after contacting various family members in accordance with his 
usual practice, instructed Mr. Lehmer to cancel the IMAI stock, reissue stock from IMAI 
to raise funds sufficient to pay the $6,000 annual lease payment, and appoint Mr. Lehmer, 
Uncle Nick, and John Condas as the directors and officers of IMAI. (R. 4596.) On 
July 1, 1993, IMAI canceled the stock Mr. Lehmer had received from R&J, and 
therefore, the IMAI stock delivered by R&J no longer exists. (Id.) 
To raise the needed $6,000, IMAI issued 6,000 shares and offered to sell them at 
$1 per share to each of the six Siblings, some of whom declined the offer. (R. 4596.) 
Eventually, the shares were purchased by (i) Mr. Lehmer (Grandchild whose mother had 
died); (ii) Uncle Nick (Sibling); (iii) John Condas (Grandchild whose father Chris Condas 
had declined the offer); (iv) George Condas (Sibling); (v) Ellen Bayas (Sibling); and 
(vi) Alexandra Ockey (Sibling and Mr. Ockey's mother). (R. 4596-97.) With the money 
raised from the stock offering, IMAI made the $6,000 annual payment due under the 
State Lease and thereby maintained the possibility the State Lands could be used in 
conjunction with the Ranch for future development. (R. 4597.) 
In addition to needing funds to make payments under the State Lease, IMAI 
needed someone to devote the time to run IMAI, which Mr. Lehmer, with help from other 
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family members, did. (R. TT: 134-35.) In return for services provided to IMAI, various 
family members—including Mr. Lehmer and Mr. Ockey's mother, Alexandra Ockey— 
received IMAI stock instead of payment, mainly because IMAI had no money to pay 
them. (R. TT: 138-42.) As Alexandra Ockey testified at trial, Mr. Lehmer and Uncle 
Nick did more than anyone to make the development of the Ranch (and State Lands) a 
success, and she had not been aware of how much work Mr. Lehmer had devoted to 
IMAI until she became IMAI President in 1998. (R. TT:605, 637.) 
The funds raised with the IMAI stock and the services provided by various family 
members were crucial to maintaining the State Lease, a lease that permitted the State 
Lands to be coupled with the Ranch for future development. (R. 4597.) The eventual 
development of the Ranch and State Lands benefited every lessor—including 
Mr. Ockey—by increasing the development value of the Ranch, and therefore by 
securing and maintaining the State Lease with the funds raised by selling IMAI stock, 
IMAI was acting to the benefit of all lessors under the Option Agreement. (R. 4597.) As 
the trial court found, "ownership of the State Lease added value to the development of the 
Ranch and ultimately allowed for the purchase by IMAI of the State [Lands], 505 acres, 
and an additional 410 acres that became part of the Ranch development," thereby causing 
"the family real estate development to become much more valuable." (R. 4601.) Mr. 
Ockey does not challenge this factual finding. 
It is the IMAI stock R&J gave to Mr. Lehmer on June 30, 1993, that Mr. Ockey 
claims should have been distributed in proportion to ownership interest in the Ranch, 
instead of being canceled so new stock could be issued to raise the funds required to 
maintain the State Lease. (R. TT:284.) Mr. Ockey makes this claim even though he has 
never pointed to any provision in either the power-of-attorney agreement or the Option 
Agreement (or any other document) that required his favored distribution. (R. TT:284.) 
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Assuming Mr. Ockey were correct, if anyone received Mr. Ockey's share of the 
IMAI stock, it was Alexandra Ockey and Uncle Nick, from whom Mr. Ockey had 
obtained his undivided interest in the Ranch (via the Trusts), and who, therefore, were not 
lessors under the Option Agreement to that extent. (R. 4593.) Before trial, Mr. Ockey 
voluntarily dismissed his claims against Alexandra Ockey and the estate of Uncle Nick, 
who had died June 21, 1999. (R. 4591; 1842.) At times, Mr. Ockey appears to agree that 
under his own theory it was his mother, not Mr. Lehmer or IMAI, who "cheated" him 
(assuming anyone did). (R. TT:299-302.) In any event, Mr. Ockey testified that under 
his favored method of distributing the IMAI stock, Mr. Lehmer would have received 
more stock, not less, and therefore, under Mr. Ockey's own theory someone other than 
Mr. Lehmer received (and has) the stock he seeks. (R. TT: 166-67; 296.) 
D. Mr. Ockey's Knowledge of the IMAI Stock Transfers 
Mr. Ockey, a stock broker between 1983 and 1987, claims he was unaware of the 
stock transfers concerning the IMAI stock, even though he lived with Uncle Nick—the 
family communicator—at the time, and, as his mother testified, Mr. Ockey was obsessed 
with development of the Ranch, discussing it with everyone he could. (R. 4598; TT:263, 
346, 568, 574, 828-29.) Mr. Ockey certainly was aware of the stock transfers by the fall 
of 1993 (or early 1994 at the latest), when he overhead a conversation between Uncle 
Nick and Suzi Lehmer Kontgis (Grandchild) in which Uncle Nick agreed to sell some of 
his IMAI stock to Ms. Kontgis, a sale eventually consummated on April 15, 1994, the 
same date IMAI issued 6,000 more shares to raise sufficient funds to make the 1994 
annual payment under the State Lease. (R. 4598; TT:258-61, 970.) 
In addition, and as Mr. Ockey admitted at trial, Uncle Nick told him to look 
through his stacks of records concerning the Ranch, IMAI, and the State Lease to satisfy 
any concerns he had. (R. TT:292, 354-55.) These records were on Uncle Nick's desk at 
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his house, where Mr. Ockey lived. (See id.) Mr. Ockey's cousin and one-time co-
plaintiff, Cathy Condas, testified that Mr. Ockey reviewed the documents at Uncle Nick's 
house to "keep himself folly informed." (R. 3839.) Finally, Keith Kelly—who oversaw 
development of the Ranch and State Lands—testified that Mr. Ockey was always 
discussing the development with him. (R. TT:702.) For these reasons, the trial court 
found that by early 1994, Mr. Ockey "knew that shares of IMAI were not distributed or 
issued in proportion to family members' interests in the [Ranch], nor in proportion to 
their interests in the Option [Agreement]." (R. 4602.) 
Despite having asked Uncle Nick about the IMAI stock pledged to Ms. Kontgis, 
Mr. Ockey did not attempt to buy any stock (or any of the additional stock issued in 
1994) from anyone, including his mother or Mr. Lehmer, both of whom Uncle Nick had 
suggested Mr. Ockey ask. (R. TT:261-62, 818.) The reason Mr. Ockey did not ask to 
buy IMAI stock was because he had no money at the time: (i) in March 1993, Mr. Ockey 
was out of money and had to ask his mother for $1,000, which she provided; (ii) in the 
summer of 1993, Mr. Ockey thought he would have to declare bankruptcy; (iii) by 
October 1993, Mr. Ockey had credit card bills totaling $27,000; and (iv) in July 1994, 
Mr. Ockey in fact did declare bankruptcy. (R. TT:310-15.) Mr. Ockey earned an income 
of $7,028.48 in 1993, and only $2,500 in 1994, the time period within which Mr. Ockey 
claims he would have purchased $1,000 worth of IMAI stock had it been offered to him. 
(R. TT:318, 324.) It was Mr. Ockey inability to buy the stock, not his lack of notice, that 
explains why he does not own any: As the trial court later found, Mr. Ockey "knew or 
had reason to know of the events giving rise to a conversion claim within the three years 
after conversion of IMAI stock." (R. 4599.) 
E. The Colony Development of the Ranch 
After the State Lease was secure in the fall of 1993, Mr. Lehmer, along with Uncle 
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Nick and John Condas, negotiated with Keith Kelly and Walter Brett to develop the 
Ranch and State Lands, a development which would eventually become the Colony, 
located between Park City and The Canyons ski resorts. (R. TT:699-704.) Around this 
time, Mr. Ockey also met with Mr. Kelly and Mr. Brett and discussed plans for the 
development. (R. TT:437.) In January 1994, the owners of the Ranch—including 
Mr. Ockey—formed, and became limited partners of, Iron Mountain Alliance, Ltd. 
("IMALTD"), and signed directives to convey (or simply conveyed) their interest in the 
Ranch to IMALTD. (R. 1142; TT:326-29; 707.) Even though Mr. Ockey's directive to 
convey identified him as beneficiary instead of the owner, Mr. Ockey testified that he 
understood his interest in the Ranch was being transferred to IMALTD. (R. TT:255.) 
In November 1994, the interests of IMALTD were transferred to a limited liability 
company, Iron Mountain Holding Group, LC ("IMHG"); and on September 14, 1995, 
IMHG (which owned the Ranch), IMAI (which owned the State Lands), and White Pine 
Associates, LLC ("White Pine") (Messrs. Kelly and Brett's company) entered into an 
operating agreement, whereby any net profits from the development would be distributed 
as follows: White Pine 30%; IMHG 55.9%; and IMAI 14.1%. (R. TT:708-12.) 
Mr. Ockey received copies of the operating agreement, and during this time, attended 
nearly every meeting concerning the development. (R. TT:262-65; 723.) At the time of 
trial—before the most recent real estate boom—Mr. Kelly estimated that the net profits 
from the development would be between $120-140 million, of which Mr. Ockey is likely 
to receive $11 million for his interest in IMHG. (R. TT:710-14.) This is not enough for 
Mr. Ockey, who claims that he also should have been given the IMAI stock that was 
instead sold to others to make the State Lease payment. (Opening Brief at 19-42.) 
In late 1996, Mr. Ockey broadcast to the community in Park City his belief that 
the operating agreement had been breached, a broadcast that was undermining 
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Mr. Kelly's ability to negotiate with Park City, Summit County, the nearby ski resorts, 
and the water companies. (R. TT:741-44.) Mr. Ockey was also negotiating with other 
developers to take over the project, which was a breach of confidentiality under the 
operating agreement. (R. TT:748.) To dispel rumors so Mr. Kelly could continue his 
work, in January 1997 the family signed a resolution in support of the current developers. 
(R. TT:745-46.) The family confronted Mr. Ockey with his breach of confidentiality, and 
when Mr. Ockey refused to say whom he had talked with concerning the development, 
the family banned Mr. Ockey from future meetings. (R. TT:748-49.) A few months 
later, Mr. Ockey filed this lawsuit against 14 members of his family, 3 family companies, 
and the developers, even though Mr. Ockey had already received substantial benefits 
from the development through no efforts of his own and stood to be (and has been) paid 
millions of dollars more. (R. 3-47; 4602.) 
F. The Settlement Agreement 
After filing the lawsuit, Mr. Ockey realized his claims might undermine the entire 
development because people would not purchase lots from the developers with quiet title 
claims pending, and so on July 22, 1998, Mr. Ockey, along with his company, OK 
Investments Inc. ("OK Investments"), entered into a settlement agreement with the 
developers and IMALLC, which held title to the Ranch. (R. 1157.) The stated purpose 
of the settlement agreement was "to allow the [development] to go forward without 
further delay." (R. 1158.) To achieve this purpose, Mr. Ockey acknowledged that record 
title to the Ranch "presently is vested in IMHG" (a member of IMALLC), and agreed that 
"no result in the Litigation shall ever prevent [IMALLC] from acquiring fee simple title 
to [Mr.] Ockey's or [OK Investments'] interests in the [Ranch], and to vesting such 
interests in [IMALLC] to the same extent as would have occurred if the Litigation never 
had been filed and did not exist." (R. 1157, 1162.) 
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In addition, Mr. O c k e y a c k n o w l e d g e d that b y ilie i line he s i g n e d the set t lement' 
agreement , O K Investments had "acquired all o f [Mr.] O c k e y ' s right, title, and interest in 
and to [the R a n c h ] . " ( F 1 ISX ) H i e i e l o r e , M r . O c k e y not o n l y agreed to w a i v e • • 
irrevocably any future c l a i m to the Ranch, h e had already g i v e n up any interest be ni;t 
h a v e had in the ICtiieli I H )K Investments , a c o m p a n y that w a s never , and is not, a party 
to this lawsuit. (R. 1158, 1162.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Ockey is not entitled to cilho i eniedy he seeks from Mr. Lehmer. With his 
quiet title and declaratory judgment claims, Mr. Ockey seeks to quiet title in a portion ul 
the Ranch lie claims IK IS < io oy operation of the Trusts. However, Mr. Lehmer 
does not, and has never, claimed title to the interest in the Ranch Mi Ockey claims, and 
therefore, there is no controversy for the Court to resolve. A former defendant in this 
lawsuit—IMALLC—did claim title to ilia I poi lion of the Ranch, but Mr. Ockey 
dismissed IMALLC in 1998 after signing a settlement agreement in which, he agreed title 
could vest in 11\ IA III 'to the same extent as would have occurred if the Litigation never 
had been filed and did not exist." (R. 1162.) In addition, Mr I ivkey acknowledged in 
the same settlement agreement that he already had transferred any interest he had in the 
Ranch to OK Investments, and therefore he had no ownership interest to bring his claims 
in the first place. Finally, Mr. Ockey was never entitled to a portion of the Ranch under 
the Trusts, as the trustees always had the option to pay Mr. Ockey money instead of 
dividing the Ranch. Mr. Ockey has no interest ii i the Kant li lo quiet title in, and even if 
he did, he could not quiet it as to Mr. Lehmer because Mr. Lehmer claims no title to it. 
Mr. Ockey has no standing to maintaiii his quiet title claims, which are moot. 
With his conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims, Mi Ockey seeks the sole 
remedy of return ol ce» tain IMAI stock he claims should have been distributed to him in 
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1993. However, Mr. Lehmer does not possess the stock Mr. Ockey claims should have 
been distributed to him, and therefore, Mr. Ockey cannot recover it from Mr. Lehmer. 
Under Mr. Ockey's theory, the stock should have been distributed in proportion to 
ownership interest in the Ranch, which would have given Mr. Ockey a 13.89% interest in 
IMAI, an interest that went to others. It is undisputed, however, that had the stock been 
distributed as Mr. Ockey suggests, then Mr. Lehmer would have received more, not less, 
IMAI stock than he did. (R. TT:296.) Because Mr. Ockey received his interest in the 
Ranch from Alexandra Ockey and Uncle Nick, it is their stock, not Mr. Lehmer's stock, 
which should have gone to Mr. Ockey under Mr. Ockey's theory. While Alexandra 
Ockey and Uncle Nick were defendants in this lawsuit, Mr. Ockey dismissed them, and 
therefore dismissed his right to recover the stock (or interest in IMAI) he seeks. 
The fact that Mr. Ockey seeks his remedies from the wrong person, however, is 
not the only obstacle to his recovery. For his conversion claim, Mr. Ockey did not file 
suit within the three-year statute of limitations, and because he "knew or had reason to 
know of the events giving rise to a conversion claim within the three years," the 
discovery rule cannot save his claim from dismissal. (R. 4558-59; 4599.) In addition, 
because the stock transfer Mr. Ockey finds objectionable was crucial to the development 
of the Ranch—a development from which Mr. Ockey accepted millions of dollars in 
profits—his knowledge of the alleged conversion coupled with his acceptance of the 
benefits stemming from it serve as a ratification of any alleged wrongdoing. Mr. Ockey's 
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims also fail on their merits. 
Finally, Mr. Lehmer cross-appeals on another ground sufficient to support the trial 
court's dismissal of the conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Before trial, 
Mr. Ockey waived his right to recover damages and elected the sole equitable remedy of 
return of the IMAI stock. To be entitled to the equitable remedy of return of stock, 
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however, Mr. Ockey first had to demonstrate that a remedy at la vv was unavailable. At 
trial, Mi I kkc\ presented no evidence that the stock he sought to recover could not be 
valued at the time it was alleged! v eottveited or ,it (lie time Mr. Ockey first learned of the 
alleged conversion. Therefore, Mr. Ockey is not entitled to an equitable reined \ (tin » nly 
remedy he seeks), even if he were seeking his remedies from the right defendants. 
For all of these reasons, the Court should ai 
ARGUMENT 
In 1997 Mr Ockey filed 25 causes of action against 14 members of his family and 
3 family companies. In 2001, the trial court dismissed two of Mr i h 'key \ claims— 
declaratory judgment and q;t net title ("quiet title claims")—and just before trial • 
Mr. Ockey voluntarily dismissed the majority of his remnininy \' iaims against nearly 
every remaining defendant, leaving only two claims—conversion and breach of fiduciary 
duty—against his cousin, Mr. Lehmer, «nui one claim—conversion—against a family-
owned company, IMAI. Mr. Ockey also waived his right to recover damages, electing 
instead the sole rtjuilahlc • icineily of return of some stock Mr. Ockey claims was 
wrongfully withheld on June 30, 1993. The trial coin i ruled in favor of Mr. Lehmer on 
the conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims. On appeal, Mr. Ockey challenges 
this ruling, along with the trial court's dispositioii of his quiet title claims. 
In Mr. Ockey's opening brief, he argues that a portion of the Ranch irrevocably 
vested in luni m I fM /' by nperittiun of the Trusts, and that because any subsequent 
transaction involving his portion of the Ranch is void, not meiely voidable, the trial court 
erred by dismissing his quiet title claims based upon a ratification theory, (Opening Brie I 
at 12-15.) As demonstrated m below, Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims fail for a 
number of reasons, only one of which involves ratification: 
i I" 11 I rhmiT I las never claimed title to the interest in the Ranch that is the 
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subject of the quiet title claims. Therefore, there is no controversy 
regarding title between Mr. Ockey and Mr. Lehmer for the Court to resolve. 
• Sometime before 1998, Mr. Ockey transferred any "right, title and interest 
in and to" the Ranch to OK Investments. Therefore, Mr. Ockey has no 
standing to maintain the quiet title claims on his own behalf. 
• Mr. Ockey entered into a settlement agreement in 1998, in which he agreed 
IMALLC would retain title to the Ranch no matter how Mr. Ockey's quiet 
title claims are adjudicated. Therefore, the quiet title claims are moot. 
• The Trusts did not entitle Mr. Ockey to a portion of the Ranch, but instead 
provided the trustee with a choice of partitioning the Ranch or 
compensating Mr. Ockey with money. Therefore, only the right to 
monetary compensation vested in 1987. 
• Mr. Ockey ratified any transfer and use of his interest in the Ranch by 
(i) participating fully in the development of the Ranch, (ii) accepting more 
than $2 million in benefits made possible by the transfer of his interest to 
IMALTD, and (iii) later agreeing to allow title to whatever interest he had 
to vest in IMALLC so he could continue to reap the benefits of the transfer. 
For all of these reasons, Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims fail. 
Mr. Ockey's arguments concerning his conversion and breach of fiduciary duty 
claims are similarly flawed. In his opening brief, Mr. Ockey argues that Mr. Lehmer 
converted IMAI stock (and breached his fiduciary duty) on June 30, 1993, when IMAI 
failed to distribute its stock proportionally to the lessors under the Option Agreement. 
(Id. at 19-22.) As demonstrated more fully below, Mr. Ockey's conversion and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims also fail for a number of reasons, including the following: 
• Mr. Ockey has never cited to any authority requiring IMAI to distribute its 
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stock to the lessors according to their ownership inter esi m ilie R;»in "h 
Therefore, no conversion occurred, as Mr. Ockey has established no 
ownership interest in the stock when it was canceled. " 
• Mr. Ockey filed his conversion claims outside the three-year statute of 
limitations, and because Mr. Ockey knew about the stock transfers 
involving the IMAI stock in late 1993, or early i 4^M ai llie latest ilii" 
discovery rule cannot save Mr. Ockey's conversion claim from dismissal. 
• Mr. Ockey not only knew ; 11 ><»111 (I it • s(i K • k »»ansfers and failed to object, but 
has benefited by millions of dollars from the development made possibl r 
the transfers hi nun I mds objectionable. By accepting benefits after 
learning of the transfers, Mr. Ockey ratified any defect in those transfers. 
• Mi < K key waived his right to all remedies except return of the stock 
allegedly converted in 1993 whe * f • •*^  should have been 
distributed according to ownership interest in the Ranch. It is undisputed, 
however, thai Mi 1 ehmoi would have received more stock, not less, under 
Mr. Ockey's favored distribution. Therefore, Mr I elmier does: i lot 1 lave 
the stock (or ownership interest) Mr. Ockey seeks. 
For all of these reasons, the trial court did not en b;y dismissing Mr. Ockey's conversion 
and breach of fiduciary duty claims. The Court should affirm. 
1, Mr. Ockey's Quiet Title Claims Fail Because Mr. Ockey Has Sued the Wrong 
Defendant, the Claims are Moot, and Mr. Ockey Ratified the Transfer of the 
Interest in the Ranch to Which He Seeks to Quiet Title. 
In his-1 iprmnji brief, Mi Ockey seeks to quiet title in the 13.89% undivided 
interest in the Ranch that he acquired in 1 *)X7 b> operation ol (he Trusts (the "Ranch 
Interest"). (Opening Brief at 13.) Mr. Ockey claims that after the Ranch Interest had 
vested, any subsequent transfer of that interest is void—not merely voidable—and 
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therefore he still owns the interest in the Ranch today, despite having voluntarily signed a 
1994 "Directive to Convey" the Ranch Interest to Iron Mountain Alliance, Ltd. 
("IMALTD") and having entered into a 1998 settlement agreement with IMALTD's 
successor in interest, Iron Mountain Alliance, L.L.C. ("IMALLC"), whereby Mr. Ockey 
waived any future claim to any interest in the Ranch. (Opening Brief at 13-15; R. 1142, 
1162.) Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims fail for a number of reasons. 
A. Mr. Ockey Cannot Maintain Quiet Title Claims Against Mr. Lehmer 
Who Claims No Interest in the Subject Property. 
The first reason Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims fail is that Mr. Lehmer has never 
made any claim to the Ranch Interest.6 On December 27, 2000, in his third amended 
complaint against seven remaining defendants—including Mr. Lehmer—Mr. Ockey 
asserted quiet title claims against unspecified "Defendants [who] at various times claimed 
an estate or interest in [Mr. Ockey's ] interest in the Ranch." (R. 2643.) The interest in 
the Ranch Mr. Ockey is referring to is the Ranch Interest. (Id.) Because Mr. Lehmer has 
never made any claim to the Ranch Interest, he is simply the wrong defendant to 
Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims. 
Under Utah Code section 78-40-1, a quiet title action can be brought only "against 
another who claims an estate or interest in real property . . . for the purpose of 
determining such adverse claim." IdL Here, there is no adverse claim because 
Mr. Lehmer claims no "estate or interest" in the Ranch Interest. In Mr. Lehmer's answer 
to the third amended complaint, he denied Mr. Ockey's allegation that he had "at various 
times claimed an estate or interest in [the Ranch Interest], which claims are contrary and 
adverse to [Mr. Ockey's] interests." (R. 3968.) As the Court explained in Richards v. 
Baum, even if a defendant once claimed title to real property subject to a quiet title 
6
 "[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f20, 52 
P.3dll58. 
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action—which Mr. Lehmer has not even done—the fact the defendant no iottgrt i lainis 
any interest inakrs it impropn lor the Court to decide the merits of the quiet title claim. 
914 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 1996). It is improper bvatmv ' ((|o surard in an action to quiet 
title to real estate, a plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not 
on the weakness of a defendant's title oi even its total lack of title." Church v. Meadow 
Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983). There is no controversy 
between Mi, ( klv\ imd Mi i ehmer concerning title, and therefore the Court should 
affirm the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims against Mr. Lehmer. 
B. Mr. Ockey's Quiet Title Claims Fail Because He Transferred Any 
Interest He Had in the Ranch to Another Entity. 
The secoiid reason Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims fail is that Mr. Ockey transferred 
the Ranch Interest to his company, OK Investments. In i July 22, 1998 settlement 
agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") between Mr. Ockey and OK Investments, on 
the one hand, and IMALLC am *b<• < t welopers), on the other hand, 
Mr. Ockey acknowledged that "OK [Investments] has acquired all ol <)ckey \ right, title 
and interest in ;nul lo (flic Ranch Interest]." (R. 1158.) Thus, not only does Mr. Lehmer 
make no claim to the Ranch Interest, Mr. Ockey transferred any interest he had. 
As the Court has explained, "a quiet title action, as its name connotes, is one to 
quiet an existing title against aii atlwi \v oi hostile claim of another and not one brought 
to establish title. One seeking such equitable relief must allege title, entitlement to 
possession, and he estate or interest claimed by others is adverse or hostile to the 
alleged claims of title or interest." Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Santiago, 590 
P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). Here, Mr. Ockey has no claim to title 
because he voluntarily transferred the Ranch Interest to his own company, OK 
Investments. For this additional reason, the Court should affirm the trial court's 
dismissal ol l\ li Ockey's quiet title claims against Mr. Lehmer. 
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C. Mr. Ockey's Quiet Title Claims Are Moot Because He Irrevocably 
Waived Any Right He Had to the Ranch Interest. 
The third reason Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims fail is that Mr. Ockey agreed (in 
the Settlement Agreement) that disposition of the quiet title claims would have no effect 
on title to the Ranch. Specifically, Mr. Ockey irrevocably waived any claim he had to the 
Ranch Interest in favor of IMALLC, a former defendant. The history of the quiet title 
claims reveals that Mr. Ockey's waiver has rendered the quiet title claims moot. 
On June 19, 1997, Mr. Ockey filed his original complaint seeking to quiet title to 
the Ranch Interest not against Mr. Lehmer, but against five other defendants: (i) Iron 
Mountain Holding Group L.C.; (ii) IMALLC; (iii) IMAI; (iv) White Pine Associates 
Ltd.; and (v) White Pine Associates Inc. (R. 18.) On July 22, 1998, Mr. Ockey, along 
with his company OK Investments, entered into the Settlement Agreement with IMALLC 
and the White Pine entities. (R. 1157.) Thereafter, when Mr. Ockey filed his second 
amended complaint, he did not name any of the parties to the Settlement Agreement, 
thereby dismissing them from the lawsuit. (R. 1158.) 
In the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Ockey acknowledged that "[rjecord title to 
the . . . Property presently is vested in [IMHG (a member of IMALLC)]" and that "no 
result in the Litigation shall ever prevent [IMALLC] from acquiring fee simple title to 
Ockey's . . . interest in [the Ranch], and to vesting such interests in [IMALLC] to the 
same extent as would have occurred if the Litigation never had been filed and did not 
exist." (R. 1157, 1162.) In addition, Mr. Ockey agreed that no claim Mr. Ockey has 
"asserted or could assert concerning the title to the [Ranch] shall ever, in any way, cloud, 
interfere with, or be superior to the title of any of [IMALLC's] third-party purchasers of 
the [Ranch] and/or any part thereof." (R. 1162.) Finally, Mr. Ockey agreed to—and 
did—release the notice of interest he had recorded against the Ranch. (R. 1164.) In 
return for Mr. Ockey waiving any future claim to the Ranch Interest, IMALLC and White 
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Pine would continue the development (resulting in millions of dollars - K ke\».-*. \ 
would agree not to intervene in this lawsuit to protect title to the Ranch. • - 1161-62.) 
As a result of the Settlement Agreement, Ilk- adfudieitltoti of the quiet title claims • 
will have no effect on title to the Ranch. A quiet title action is moot where "[n]o action 
which [the Court] -could m w\ Ukr \v\mid affect the litigants' rights to the property." 
Richards v. Baum; 914 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 1996); see also Burkett v. Schwendiman, /15 
P.2d 42,44 | Utah 1989) ("A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief 
cannot affect the rights of the litigants."); Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 411 
(Utah 1982) ("If the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the 
case is moot and a court will imi mully ivtrain from adjudicating it on the merits."); 
Kellch v. Westland Minerals Corp., 26 Utah 2d 42, 484 P 2d 7,16 ( Wn ) (dismissing .m 
appeal as inoot where the Court was "without power to grant any relief to the appellant 
and upon remand the court below would be equally powerless"). Because the disposition 
of Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims will have no affect on title, the claims are moot. 
In his opening brief, • *ckey argues that he nonetheless can maintain his quiet 
title claims because the parties to the Settlement Agreement agreed that "the I itigation 
shall Iv (vniitiinl to go forward." (Opening Brief at 17.) Mr. Ockey argues that this 
demonstrates he did not ratify the transfer of t "reaffirmed 
his intent to continue pursuing the claims he was pursuing before he settled with the 
developers," (Id.) Pulling asick; llv fact that Mr. Ockey was not pursuing quiet title 
claims against Mr. Lehmer prior to the Settlement Agreement, f\li Ockey's at ^ untaif is 
beside the point. Ihe issue is not one of ratification, but mootness.7 The fact that one 
7
 Similarly, the fact the Settlement Agreement contemplates the possibility of a 
"Favorable Title Judgment" for Mr. Ockey is of no consequence because it does not 
change the fact that adjudication of the quiet title claims cannot affect title, which is the 
relevant mootness consideration. In any event, for a Favorable Title Judgment to occur 
under the Settlement Agreement, it must be a judgment that "could affect title to the 
[Ranch]," something that cannot occur because Mr Ockey has agreed "no result in the 
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specifically intends to pursue a moot claim does not create a controversy for a court to 
resolve. The Court should affirm the dismissal of the quiet title claims as moot. 
D. Mr. Ockey's Quiet Title Claims Fail Because He Was Guaranteed Only 
Money, Not a Portion of the Ranch, under the Trusts. 
The fourth reason Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims fail is that he was never 
guaranteed title to a portion of the Ranch, but instead only monetary compensation for 
the value of his Ranch Interest. Under the Trusts, once Mr. Ockey reached a certain age, 
"the entire trust property then remaining shall be paid over and distributed to him . . . free 
and discharged of all trust." (R. 2327.) However, whenever the trustee was called upon 
"to distribute" or "to divide" the trust property—which was a percentage undivided 
interest in the Ranch—the trustee was "authorized and empowered in the Trustee's sole 
discretion, to make division or distribution in kind, or partly in kind and partly in money 
or by granting, transferring or assigning an undivided interest." (R. 2332-33.) 
Mr. Ockey was not guaranteed he would receive title to a portion of the Ranch, but 
instead was guaranteed only money representing the value of the Ranch Interest. While 
Mr. Ockey may have had a claim for damages in the amount of money he should have 
been paid in 1987 when the Trusts terminated, he cannot maintain a quiet title action. 
Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 1979) ("a quiet 
title action, as its name connotes, is one to quiet an existing title"). For this additional 
reason, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Ockey's quiet title 
claims against Mr. Lehmer. 
Litigation shall ever prevent [IMALLC] from acquiring fee simple title." (R. 1161-62). 
The Court should not entertain Mr. Ockey's "side bet" with former defendants, and 
instead should focus on controversies upon which it can impact the rights of parties. 
8
 Mr. Ockey also is not entitled to damages, as he never made such a claim and in the trial 
court he waived his right to recover any damages. In addition, Mr. Ockey has been paid 
millions of dollars for his conveyance of any interest in the Ranch he had, which far 
exceeds what he would have received in 1987 had he demanded it under the Trusts. 
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E. Mr. Ockey "s Quiet Title Claims Fail Because He Ratified Any Defects 
in His Prior Conveyance of the Ranch Interest 
11 ii1 11 f 111 H <i oni i M i Ockey's quiet title claims fail is that he ratified his prior 
conveyance of the Ranch Interest by accepting benefit s 1 e 111111 n i JJ, 11 o 111 (11, i f conveyance 
after coming to believe title to the Ranch Interest should have been transferred to him in 
1987. In the opening brief, Mi < h kr\ t lamis lit did not ratify his prior conveyances 
because the Settlement Agreement contemplates that Mr. Ockey can maintain his quict 
titlt < lai ins and I lie tcfore, he did not "unequivocally" ratify his conveyance of interest. 
(Opening Brief at 17-18.) However, Mr. Ockey \s latilit atiun is dcmnnstiated by Ins 
"unequivocal" acceptance of millions of dollars in benefits after knowing the benefits 
were made possible by the um\ey<nu r In tiou < I w ins was defective (or even void). Self-
serving language placed in the Settlement Agreement cannot change this fact. 
In I iiiiiary 1994, the owneis of the Ranch—including Mr. Ockey—formed, and 
became limited partners of, IMALTD They signed directi\cs (u * oii\ r\ (or simply did 
convey) any interest they had in the Ranch to IMALTD. (R. 1142; TT:326-29; 707.) 
Even though Mr. Ockey's directive to coin t \ identilinJ I urn as a beneficiary instead of 
an owner, Mr. Ockey testified that he understood any interest he had in the Ranch was 
being (t a 11 s f « M I u 11 o IM \ L1D so lie could become a part owner in the company, which he 
became and still is. (R. TT:255.) All of the evidence suggests dial M HI il Itit paperwork 
had identified Mr. Ockey as owner instead of beneficiary, he nonetheless would have 
transferred his interest to IM \ I ID iml IK C on it a paitnei with the same interest in 
IMALTD (worth millions of dollars). For this reason, Mr Ockey's 1W4 conveyance 
does not i up lire ratification, as there is no evidence Mr. Ockey would have made any 
different decision concerning the transfer of (In Ram li Inlrit ,| to IM \L lDin 1994. The 
Settlement Agreement is belt and suspenders. 
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The fact that Mr. Ockey does not claim he would have done anything but what he 
did—namely, transfer any interest he had to IMALTD—also demonstrates this case is 
nothing like the case Mr. Ockey relies upon in his brief, Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 
53,144 P.3d 1129. (Opening Brief at 13.) In Nolan, the beneficiary was told 
(incorrectly) she had no interest in real property transferred to her via irrevocable trust, 
and absent this representation, she would not have consented to the transfer of her interest 
without compensation. IcL at 1fl[8-l0. Here> M r - Ockey knew about the Trusts, and has 
been paid millions of dollar for having transferred the Ranch Interest to IMALTD (and 
ultimately to IMALLC), something he did knowingly. Nolan does not hold that a 
beneficiary can profit from the transfer of real property he obtained via an irrevocable 
trust, and then later void that transfer through a court proceeding just because the papers 
by which the interest was conveyed happened to identify him as "beneficiary" instead of 
"owner." The conveyance of the Ranch Interest to IMALTD in 1994 is not void. Again, 
Mr. Ockey's claims fail independent of the Settlement Agreement. 
With the Settlement Agreement, however, Mr. Ockey ratified any defect in the 
conveyance. Mr. Ockey retained his right to share in the profits of the development, a 
right made possible only by his transfer of the Ranch Interest to IMALTD. Then, in the 
Settlement Agreement, to ensure these profits would continue to flow, Mr. Ockey agreed 
that his original conveyance of the Ranch Interest would stand, no matter how this case 
was resolved. Under Utah law, "[a]ny conduct which indicates assent by the purported 
principal to become a party to the transaction" constitutes ratification of the transaction. 
Bullock v.Utah, 966 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Utah App. 1998); see also Swan Creek Vill. 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne. 2006 UT 22, ^ |34,134 P.3d 1122 ("the principle of 
ratification [can] establish the validity of an act even though certain, express formalities 
have not been met"); Lowe v. April Indus.. Inc., 531 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1974) 
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(holding that a "delay in repudiation gives rise to an implied or de facto ratification of [ a | 
contract"); Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, B.P.O.E., 88 Utah 577, 
56P.2d 1046, 1047-48 (1936) ("Ratification ma\ IK implied h\ Juiiiicstcucc in m 
recognition of, the act of the officers by the corporation or by acts tending to show an 
acceptance oi adoption ml flu totitutt ); Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.2d 699 
(1934) (ratification occurs "either expressly or impliedly, as by recognizing or treating 
[the conveyance of real property] as binding, or accepting benefits under it, with full 
knowledge of the fraud or misrepresentation and oi ins li^al i M1 Ills ) 
In this case, Mr. Ockey continues to benefit from the conveyance of the Ranch 
Interesl to IM \ I 11) w t II atfn IK tirst learned the Trusts had terminated in 1987, 
something he claims to have learned in 1997 Nonetheless, with full knowledge of the 
termination of the Trusts, in 1998 Mr. Ockey entered into the Settlement Agreement, in 
which he reaffirmed that IMA I 1 C (successor ol IM VI 11 >) would i< lain title In the 
Ranch Interest so Mr. Ockey could continue to benefit from that previous transfer by 
allowing the di\elo|>menl oi the Kanchtogo lorwaid. Mi. Ockey ratified the 1994 
conveyance, and his quiet title claims fail for this additional reason. For all of these 
reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the quiet title claims. 
II. Mr. Ockey's Conversion and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Fail Because 
the Sole Equitable Remedy He Seeks Is Unavailable, He Ratified the Stock 
Transfers Forming the Basis of His Claims, and He Filed Outside the Three-
Year Statute of Limitations. 
Mr. Ockey also appeals the trial court's dismissal of his conversion and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims li\ lh< time of trial I hi hash ol both t lanns was identn al: 
Mr. Ockey maintains that the IMAI stock R&J delivered to Mr. Lehmer on June 30, 
1993, bIinuhi 111> c been distributed to the lessors under the Option Agreement in 
proportion to their ownership interest in the Ranch, instead of being canceled so new 
stock could be issued to raise the funds necessary to maintain the State Lease. (Opening 
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Brief at 19.) Mr. Ockey also waived his right to damages, and elected instead the sole 
remedy of return of the stock allegedly converted. (R. 4603.) 
The trial court found in favor of Mr. Lehmer on both claims because 
(i) Mr. Lehmer did not possess the stock Mr. Ockey seeks to recover, and therefore to 
order Mr. Lehmer to give his own stock to Mr. Ockey would be to award a type of 
damages, not an equitable remedy; (ii) Mr. Ockey filed his conversion claim outside the 
three-year statute of limitations, and because Mr. Ockey presented no evidence of 
concealment and was aware of his claim within three years, the discovery rule does not 
apply; and (iii) Mr. Ockey ratified the stock transfers by accepting the benefits of the 
development of the Ranch after learning of the nature of the stock transfers. (R. 4694-
95.) As demonstrated below, the trial court was correct in each ruling. 
A. The Sole Remedy Mr. Ockey Elected Is Unavailable As to Mr. Lehmer. 
The sole equitable remedy Mr. Ockey sought at trial was return of the IMAI stock 
allegedly converted in 1993 when IMAI failed to distribute it in proportion to ownership 
interest in the Ranch at the time, the method of distribution preferred by Mr. Ockey. The 
trial court ruled that this remedy was unavailable as to Mr. Lehmer because the stock 
allegedly converted (the stock delivered by R&J on June 30, 1993) no longer exists, and 
even if it did, the court could not order Mr. Lehmer as an individual shareholder (and not 
the company itself) to give his shares to Mr. Ockey. (R. 4603-04.) 
In his opening brief, Mr. Ockey argues an equitable remedy was available and 
should have been awarded to him by the trial court. (Opening Brief at 41-42.) 
Specifically, Mr. Ockey claims the trial court could have awarded him an "ownership 
interest" in IMAI, even though the stock itself no longer existed. (Id.) Mr. Ockey cites 
no legal authority to support this claim, and it fails for a number of reasons. 
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1, Mr. Lehmer Does Not Possess the Property Mr. Ockey Seeks, 
and Therefore, Mr. Lehmer Cannot Return the Property. 
The trial court correctly ruled that ordering Mr. Lehmer to deliver his own shares 
of IMAI stock to Mr. Ockey was not an equitable rnned / mnmly because Mr, I tinner 
does not have the stock (or ownership interest) which Mr. Ockey claims was converted. 
Theproperti Mi Oeko claims should hau InviHlrliveredtohimin 1993—whether it is 
best characterized as stock or an ownership interest—is a percentage of the IMA I stock 
delivered by R&J to Mi. Lehmer on June 30, 1993. The percentage Mr. Ockey claims he 
was due is the amount of stock proportional to his owner J up ml nest in the R and i at the 
time. Mr. Ockey's ownership interest in the Ranch on June 30, 1993, came from the 
Trusts, b) whicl i \lexai ldi a Ockey (his i i lother) and Uncle Nick transferred a 13.89% 
undivided interest in the Ranch to Mr. Ockey from their own original 1/6 interests they 
received as Siblings. After June 30, 1993, Alexandra Ockey and Uncle Nick each 
purchased 1/6 of the IMAI stock, as if they each still o\\ nni au original 1 '» interest in I he 
Ranch. Therefore, under Mr. Ockey's theory of how the IMAI stock should have been 
distil lulled, it was his inoflit'i and Uu< le Ni< k who 11 rei\ rcl his stock (or ownership 
interest) in IMAI, not Mr. Lehmer, and yet just before trial Mr. Ockey voluntarily 
dismissed his mother and Uncle Nick as defendants. 
Mr. Ockey's own testimony confirms that Ins IMAI sloe k (assuming he was 
entitled to any) went to his mother and Uncle Nick, and not Mr. Lehmer. As Mr. Ockey 
admitted at trial, uudei his theory ol how the stock should have been distributed 
Mr. Lehmer would have received more, not less, IMAI stock in 1 {N '\ IV11 shiner 
simply does not possess the property—however it is characterized—that Mr. Ockey seeks 
with his equitable remedy, and therefore, were Mr I >ekev entitled to am remedy against 
Mr. Lehmer, it would have been damages. Alta Indus, v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 
(Utah 1993) (citi,! ig i mn leroi isI Jtal t cases stating that the remedies for conversion are 
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return of the converted property or "the value of the property at the time of the 
conversion"). For this reason alone, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
Mr. Ockey's conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Mr. Lehmer. 
2. Mr. Ockey Cannot Recover Stock, Which Due to the Efforts of 
Others Is, Much More Valuable Than the Stock Allegedly 
Converted. 
The second reason Mr. Ockey cannot recover the stock (or ownership interest) he 
claims was converted in June 1993 is that the stock is much more valuable today, and just 
months after the alleged conversion Mr. Ockey had (and failed to take advantage of) the 
opportunity to purchase the amount of IMAI stock he claims he was entitled to as of 
June 30, 1993. Mr. Ockey cannot, in the name of equity, recover the IMAI stock now 
that it is worth millions of dollars, when he could have purchased it just months after the 
alleged conversion for less than $1,000, but failed to do so. 
Essentially, Mr. Ockey is attempting to recover in equity what is strictly forbidden 
at law. To value stock in conversion cases, Utah follows the so-called "New York rule," 
which "sets the measure of damages as the highest intermediate value of the stock 
between the time of conversion and a reasonable time after the owner receives notice of 
the conversion." Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1993). The 
purpose of the New York rule is to indemnify "the owner of the converted stock for his or 
her loss, while requiring the owner to mitigate damages by replacing the stock within a 
reasonable time after notice of the conversion." Id Under the New York rule, assuming 
IMAI had an obligation to deliver 13.89% of the IMAI stock to Mr. Ockey on June 30, 
1993—which it did not—Mr. Ockey would have been entitled to recover only the value 
of the stock at a reasonable time after he first learned of the alleged conversion. 
The evidence indicates that Mr. Ockey learned the IMAI stock had been purchased 
by others in late 1993, or at the latest early 1994, when Mr. Ockey admits he overheard a 
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conversion between Uncle Nick and Ms. Kontgis in which Uncle Nick agreed to sell 
some of his IMAI stock to Ms. Kontgis, a sale eventually consummated on April 15, 
1994. (R. 4598; TT:258-61, 970.) In addition, and as Mr. Ockey also admitted at trial, 
during this time Uncle Nick gave Mr. Ockey access to, and encouraged him to look 
through, his stacks of records concerning IMAI to satisfy any concerns Mr. Ockey had. 
(R. TT:292, 354-55.) These records were on Uncle Nick's desk in his house where 
Mr. Ockey lived. (See id.) Mr. Ockey's cousin and one-time co-plaintiff, Cathy Condas, 
testified that Mr. Ockey reviewed the documents at Uncle Nick's house to "keep himself 
fully informed." (R. 3839.) Based in part upon this evidence, the trial court found that 
by early 1994 at the latest, Mr. Ockey "knew that shares of IMAI were not distributed or 
issued in proportion to family members' interests in the [Ranch], nor in proportion to 
their interests in the Option [Agreement]." (R. 4602.) 
In addition to knowing the IMAI stock had been purchased by others, Mr. Ockey 
had the opportunity to buy IMAI stock at this time. Uncle Nick encouraged Mr. Ockey to 
ask his mother or Mr. Lehmer whether he could buy some of their stock, but Mr. Ockey 
never pursued the opportunity. (R. TT:261-62, 818.) The reason Mr. Ockey did not ask 
to buy IMAI stock was because he had no money at the time, as he made $2,500 in 1994 
and declared bankruptcy in July of that year. (R. TT:310-15, 318, 324.) In April of 
1994, well after Mr. Ockey knew others owned IMAI stock, IMAI issued 6000 shares of 
stock at the same $1 price it was sold for in July 1993. Since Mr. Ockey's percentage 
ownership in the Ranch at the time of the alleged conversion was 13.89% of the original 
6000 shares issued on July 1, 1993, (which comes to 833.4 shares), the value of the stock 
Mr. Ockey claims was converted in June 1993 was $833.40. At a reasonable time after 
Mr. Ockey learned that others had received the IMAI stock, the value of the IMAI stock 
allegedly converted remained less than $1,000. 
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Recognizing this, Mr. Ockey waived his right to damages and instead tried to 
recover the stock itself, which was worth millions of dollars by the time of trial. To 
permit Mr. Ockey to do so, however, would be to permit him essentially to nullify the 
New York rule. As the Court has explained, the policy behind the New York rule is to 
indemnify "a plaintiff for the conversion of stock without affording a windfall at the 
expense of the defendant." Broadwater, 854 P.2d at 532. To allow a plaintiff to elect 
return of stock instead of damages—especially when the alleged conversion occurred 
years earlier and any damages could have mitigated—would be to permit the very 
windfall the New York rule is designed to prevent. The Court should not allow 
Mr. Ockey to obtain in equity what is strictly forbidden at law. 
The Court of Appeals has recognized this sensible rule. In Lysenko v. Sawaya, 
Lysenko had owned and operated a Burger King franchise in a building he leased from 
Sawaya. 973 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). When the lease terminated, Lysenko 
claimed conversion and sought certain restaurant equipment he had left in the building. 
By the time Lysenko brought his conversion claims, however, the new owners had leased 
the building and repaired the equipment. The court held that Lysenko was entitled only 
to damages in these circumstances, because "allowing the plaintiff to elect to recover the 
converted property itself will over-compensate him for his injury, [and therefore] the 
election must be taken away from the plaintiff." Lysenko, 973 P.2d at 448. What 
Lysenko could not do is profit from the work of others "who went to the trouble and 
expense of improving the equipment]." Id, 
As in Lysenko, IMAI as a corporation has been completely transformed and 
improved since the time of the alleged conversion on June 30, 1993. In 1993, the only 
IMAI asset was the State Lease, which carried an immediate and annual payment 
obligation of several thousand dollars. No development agreement was in place, and the 
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most recent development effort with R&J had just failed. By the time Mr. Ockey filed 
his complaint in 1997, however, IMAI (i) had entered into a development agreement with 
Mr. Kelly's company; (ii) had entered into an agreement with American Ski Company 
involving expansion of The Canyons, which permitted the lots sold in the development to 
be ski-in and ski-out; and (iii) had paid approximately $3.7 million to purchase the State 
Lands plus an addition 410 acres of state land. (R. 4601-02.) All of these events made 
IMAI stock much more valuable than it was in 1993. 
Ironically, had IMAI simply distributed the stock as Mr. Ockey suggests, and not 
sold shares to raise the funds to make the payments under the State Lease, the 
development would not have been possible and the IMAI stock would be worth very 
little, if anything. As the trial court found—a finding Mr. Ockey does not challenge as 
clearly erroneous—"ownership of the State Lease added value to the development of the 
Ranch and ultimately allowed for the purchase by IMAI of the State [Lands], 505 acres, 
and an additional 410 acres that became part of the Ranch development," thereby causing 
"the family real estate development to become much more valuable." (R. 4601.) Thus, 
like Lysenko, to allow Mr. Ockey to "recover the converted property itself will over-
compensate [him] for [his] injury." 973 P.2d at 448. 
To permit Mr. Ockey to recover IMAI stock not only would undermine the New 
York rule, but also would unjustly enrich Mr. Ockey. For this additional reason, the 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Mr. Ockey cannot recover IMAI stock 
from Mr. Lehmer as a matter of equity. 
3. Mr. Ockey Cannot Recover Stock As an Equitable Remedy 
Where He Failed to Show a Remedy at Law Is Unavailable. 
The trial court ruled that ordering Mr. Lehmer to give his IMAI stock to 
Mr. Ockey was not an available equitable remedy. Another sufficient ground to affirm 
this ruling is that Mr. Ockey was not entitled to this equitable remedy until he first 
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showed that a remedy at law was unavailable, something he did not do. The trial court 
disagreed with Mr. Lehmer that Mr. Ockey first had (and had failed) to show a remedy at 
law was unavailable before the equitable remedy Mr. Ockey sought was appropriate. 
(R. 4601.) This issue is the basis of Mr. Lehmer's cross-appeal. 
As explained above, just before trial Mr. Ockey waived his right to damages when 
he realized the value of the allegedly converted IMAI stock as of April 1994—the latest 
Mr. Ockey learned of the alleged conversion—was, at most, a few thousand dollars. 
Broadwater, 854 P.2d at 531 ("the measure of damages as the highest intermediate value 
of the stock between the time of conversion and a reasonable time after the owner 
receives notice of the conversion"). Mr. Ockey instead elected the sole equitable remedy 
of return of the allegedly converted stock, which by then was worth millions of dollars. 
Under Utah law, "the general rule is that equitable jurisdiction is precluded if the 
plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer substantial irreparable injury." 
Buckner v. Kennard. 2004 UT 78, ^ 56, 99 P.3d 842. There is no reason for the Court to 
depart from this rule in the conversion context, especially after adoption of the New York 
rule. The policy behind the New York rule is to indemnify "a plaintiff for the conversion 
of stock without affording a windfall at the expense of the defendant." Broadwater, 854 
P.2d at 532. For this reason, damages are capped at the value of the stock at a reasonable 
time after discovery of the events underlying the conversion. To permit one to elect to 
recover stock itself when its value skyrockets would undermine the policy and result in 
the very "windfall at the expense of the defendant" the New York rule is designed to 
prevent. In such circumstances, as long as the value can be quantified, damages should 
serve as the sole remedy.9 The only circumstances in which a court ordering return of 
9
 The only case suggesting otherwise was decided before Utah adopted the New York 
rule. See Robevv. Hardy. 63 Utah 231, 239, 224 P. 889 (1924) ("If the corporation is 
wrongfully withholding from him the certificate of stock for which it appears he has fully 
paid, he has a complete remedy either at law or in equity, as he may elect."). And if 
Robey were still the rule in Utah, the Court should still affirm the trial court's ruling, as 
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stock instead of damages would not undermine the purpose of the New York rule would 
be where the value of the stock at the time the plaintiff discovered the conversion cannot 
be determined (or is the same as its present value). Only where damages cannot be 
determined, and therefore a remedy at law is unavailable, may a plaintiff recover stock, 
and then because it is the only way to compensate the plaintiff for his loss. 
Here, Mr. Ockey chose to waive his right to damages not because they were 
impossible to calculate, but because the calculation did not result in a large damage 
award. At trial, Mr. Ockey presented no evidence of damages, and, more important, 
presented no evidence that the IMAI stock could not be valued in June 1993 or April 
1994. Therefore, Mr. Ockey failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating he was entitled 
to an equitable remedy.10 Because Mr. Ockey was not entitled to an equitable remedy, 
the trial court did not err in dismissing his conversion and breach of fiduciary duty 
claims. For this additional reason, the Court should affirm. 
4. If Mr. Ockey Were Entitled to Return of the IMAI Stock, He 
Would Be Entitled Only to the Stock Allegedly Converted and 
Not the Additional Stock He Claims He Would Have Purchased. 
Assuming Mr. Ockey could prevail on the merits of his conversion and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims and assuming Mr. Ockey were entitled to the equitable remedy of 
ordering Mr. Lehmer to give some of his stock to Mr. Ockey, then another issue in 
Mr. Ockey's opening brief becomes relevant: preemptive rights. The IMAI stock 
Mr. Ockey claims should have been given to him on June 30, 1993, constituted 13.89% 
of all IMAI stock, which corresponded to Mr. Ockey's percentage ownership interest in 
Robev also held that a plaintiffs remedy, whether at law or equity, "is against the 
corporation and not against the defendants." Id. Therefore, Mr. Ockey cannot recover 
from Mr. Lehmer even if 13.89% of IMAI stock should have been delivered to 
Mr. Ockey on June 30, 1993. 
10
 Not only did Mr. Ockey fail to demonstrate he was entitled to an equitable remedy, 
Mr. Lehmer demonstrated he was not. Mr. Lehmer's expert testified (unopposed) that the 
value of the percentage interest in IMAI Mr. Ockey claims was $17,677 as of June 30, 
1993. (R. TT:862-67.) 
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the Ranch at the time. By the time of trial, due to the issuance of additional stock, 
Mr. Ockey's percentage share of IMAI would have been 5.95%. In the trial court, 
Mr. Lehmer argued that even if Mr. Ockey were entitled to return of IMAI stock for 
services provided by officers and directors of IMAI, Mr. Ockey would be entitled only to 
a 5.95% interest in IMAI. On appeal, Mr. Ockey argues that had he been given the IMAI 
stock in 1993, then he would have exercised preemptive rights to purchase more stock 
whenever additional stock was issued for services; and therefore he would have 
maintained his original 13.89% interest in IMAI. (Opening Brief at 22-24.) 
Not only did Mr. Ockey fail to prove that he would have had the means to exercise 
preemptive rights between 1993 and 1995—he declared bankruptcy in 1994—but he also 
is mistaken that he was entitled to exercise preemptive rights under IMAPs articles of 
incorporation. IMAFs articles of incorporation provide that "[shareholders will have 
preemptive rights in the corporation as provided by law." (R. 3017-20 (emphasis 
added).) On July 1, 1992, the law provided that "[a] statement included in the articles of 
incorporation that 'the corporation elects to have preemptive rights,' or words of similar 
import, means that the following principles apply except to the extent the articles of 
incorporation expressly provide otherwise: . . . [t]here is no preemptive right with respect 
to . . . shares issued as compensation for services to directors, officers, agents, or 
employees of the corporation." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-630(2)(c)(i) (1992). 
Therefore, under Utah law, as incorporated by the articles of incorporation, shareholders 
of IMAI had no preemptive rights to purchase additional stock when family members 
were given stock for services. 
Mr. Ockey argues the articles of incorporation should not be read in light of 
section 16-10a-630 because "the legislature gave no indication that it intended retroactive 
application." (Opening Brief at 23.) Mr. Ockey argues that section 16-10a-630 cannot 
424272 38 
apply retroactively because the saving provision of the statute section 16-10a-630 was 
replacing provides that its repeal would not affect any "ratification, right, remedy, 
privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the statute before its 
repeal." Id (quoting Utah Code Ann. §16-101-1704(l)(b) (1991)). 
Mr. Lehmer does not argue that section 16-10a-630 has retroactive application, but 
only that it applied from July 1, 1992, forward because it was "the law" in Utah. 
Mr. Lehmer's view was shared by the officers and directors of IMAI, as the IMAI articles 
of incorporation were amended in 1995 to provide that "the shareholders shall have 
preemptive rights as to those shares [issued as compensation for services] as well." 
(R. 4050.) Between 1993 and 1995, no IMAI shareholders exercised preemptive rights to 
purchase stock when new stock was issued to compensate services provided to IMAI 
because they had none until the amendment created them. To the extent the articles of 
incorporation are ambiguous concerning whether "as provided by law" meant law frozen 
as of the date of incorporation (as Mr. Ockey appears to read it) or law at the time 
preemptive rights were to be exercised, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the 
latter reading in light of the 1995 amendment to the articles of incorporation. WebBank 
v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,1J19, 54 P.3d 1139 ("if the language of the 
contract is ambiguous such that the intentions of the parties cannot be determined by the 
plain language of the agreement, 'extrinsic evidence must be looked to in order to 
determine the intentions of the parties.' If a contract is ambiguous, the court may 
consider the parties' actions and performance as evidence of the parties' true intention."). 
Mr. Ockey would not have been entitled to exercise preemptive rights between 
1993 and 1995, the time period in which he claims he would have purchased additional 
shares to maintain his original 13.89% share of IMAI (that is, assuming he had the right 
to those shares in the first place and the funds to purchase additional shares). Therefore, 
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assuming Mr. Ockey is entitled to return of IMAI stock, he is entitled only to a 5.95% 
share of the company. However, as shown above, Mr. Ockey is not entitled to return of 
IMAI stock as an equitable remedy, especially as to Mr. Lelimer. And as shown below, 
Mr. Ockey was not entitled to the IMAI stock in the first place. The Court should affirm. 
B. Mr. Ockey's Conversion Claim Is Barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
Mr. Ockey claims the conversion of his IMAI stock took place on June 30, 1993. 
(Opening Brief at 31.) Mr. Ockey did not file his complaint until June 19, 1997, nearly 
four years after the alleged conversion. (R. 4604.) Because the statute of limitations for 
conversion claims is three years, Mr. Ockey's conversion claims were untimely. See 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(2) (1997). 
Mr. Ockey argues that despite this untimeliness, his claims are not barred by the 
statute of limitations under the equitable discovery rule. The discovery rule operates to 
toll a statute of limitations until a party discovers or reasonably should have discovered 
"facts forming the basis of the cause of action." Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 
2005 UT 14,1J21, 108 P.3d 741. Under the equitable version of the discovery rule, the 
statute of limitations is tolled in only two circumstances: "(1) where a plaintiff does not 
become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or 
misleading conduct, and (2) where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust.'*'11 Id at ^25. 
The trial court ruled that the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule 
does not apply because by the spring of 1994 (at the latest) Mr. Ockey "knew that shares 
of IMAI were not distributed or issued in proportion to family members' interests in the 
[Ranch], nor in proportion to their interests in the Option [Agreement]," and therefore, 
Mr. Ockey "knew or had reason to know of the events giving rise to a conversion claim 
11
 Mr. Ockey does not claim the exceptional-circumstances version of the discovery rule 
is applicable, and therefore, Mr. Lehmer will discuss only the concealment version. 
424272 40 
within the three years after conversion of IMAI stock." (R. 4602, 4599.) Mr. Ockey 
argues the concealment version applies because (i) the trial court's factual finding that 
Mr. Ockey knew of should have known of the events forming the basis of his claim by 
early 1994 is clearly erroneous; and (ii) Mr. Lehmer "concealed" from Mr. Ockey that he 
had received the IMAI stock from R&J. (Opening Brief at 31-41.) To support his first 
claim, Mr. Ockey argues only "circumstantial"—and no direct—evidence exists to 
support the trial court's finding that Mr. Ockey knew about his conversion claim in early 
1994, and therefore the trial court's finding was against the clear weight of the 
evidence.12 Id. at 37. To support his second claim, Mr. Ockey argues Mr. Lehmer failed 
to inform Mr. Ockey about the IMAI stock, and therefore, Mr. Lehmer concealed its 
existence from Mr. Ockey. Id at 40. The evidence reveals otherwise. 
1. Mr. Ockey Knew of the Facts Underlying His Conversion Claim 
Before June 30,1996. 
Under the concealment version of the discovery rule, Mr. Ockey must 
"demonstrate that he 'neither discovered nor reasonably should have discovered the facts 
underlying the cause of action before the limitations period expired' due to Mr. Lehmer's 
concealment." Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, f 36, 144 P.3d 1129 (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). Mr. Ockey claims the conversion occurred on June 30, 1993, and 
therefore, the three-year statute of limitations would have expired on June 30, 1996. 
The evidence reveals that Mr. Ockey knew about the IMAI stock transactions well 
before the limitations period expired. The best evidence of this is Mr. Ockey's testimony 
that he knew about IMAI's practice of issuing stock for services in 1995 and convinced 
his mother to object to the practice, an objection that ultimately resulted in Mr. Ockey's 
mother becoming president of IMAI in September 1995. (R. TT:372-73, 526.) During 
12
 Were circumstantial evidence insufficient, then the "reason to know" aspect of the 
concealment version would be useless because there is no such thing as direct evidence 
someone had a reason to know something. 
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this time, Mr. Ockey attended nearly every meeting at which IMAI stock was discussed. 
(R. TT:256.) This evidence alone demonstrates Mr. Ockey knew before June 1996 that 
others—including his own mother—had the IMAI stock he claims should have gone to 
him. Although Mr. Ockey marshaled evidence he knew about the stock transfers as early 
as 1993 or 1994, he failed to marshal his own testimony indicating he knew in 1995. 
Chen v.Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f78, 100 P.3d 1177 (when challenging a finding of fact, 
"[a]ppellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record 
in support of their position"). The evidence Mr. Ockey knew of the transfers by 
September 1995, standing alone, is sufficient to demonstrate the factual finding is not 
clearly erroneous. The following evidence also supports the trial court's finding: 
• Mr. Ockey testified that by 1995, he knew the J&R had gone into default 
and delivered the IMAI stock to Mr. Lehmer. (R. TT:256.) 
• Between June 1993 and January 1994, Mr. Ockey's mother, Alexandra 
Ockey, discussed "what was going on at the [R]anch" with Mr. Ockey, 
causing her to believe Mr. Ockey knew about the IMAI stock cancellation 
before June 1996. (R. TP.569.) 
• John Condas testified that the family's decision to cancel the IMAI stock 
received from R&J and issue new stock to raise funds to make the 
payments under the State Lease was "unanimous." (R. TT:889-900.) 
• Mr. Lehmer testified that the "family as a whole" made the decision to 
cancel the IMAI stock, just as decisions about the Ranch were always 
made. (R. TT:955-56.) 
• In late 1993 and early 1994, Mr. Ockey lived with Uncle Nick—the family 
communicator who knew everything about the family business—and, as his 
mother later testified, Mr. Ockey was obsessed with development of the 
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Ranch, discussing it with everyone he could. (R. 4598; TT:263, 346, 568, 
574, 828-29.) 
• In late 1993 or early 1994, Mr. Ockey overhead a conversation between 
Uncle Nick and Suzi Kontgis in which Uncle Nick agreed to sell some of 
his IMAI stock to Ms. Kontgis, a sale eventually consummated on April 15, 
1994. (R. 4598; TT:258-61, 970.) 
• After overhearing Uncle Nick's conversation with Ms. Kontgis, Mr. Ockey 
asked Uncle Nick about the IMAI stock, and Uncle Nick suggested 
Mr. Ockey ask his mother or Mr. Lehmer whether he could buy IMAI stock 
from them. (R. TT:261-62, 818.) 
• As Mr. Ockey admitted at trial, Uncle Nick told him to look through his 
stacks of records concerning the Ranch, IMAI, and the State Lease to 
satisfy any concerns he had, all of which were on Uncle Nick's desk at the 
house where Mr. Ockey was living. (R. TT:292, 354-55.) 
• As Mr. Ockey's cousin and one-time co-plaintiff, Cathy Condas, testified, 
Mr. Ockey did review the documents at Uncle Nick's house to "keep 
himself fully informed." (R. 3839.) 
• Mr. Ockey discussed the development with Keith Kelly a number of times 
before 1996. (R. TT:702.) 
• After 1994, Mr. Ockey attended nearly every family meeting concerning 
the development of the Ranch. (R. TT:265.) 
• Ellen Ockey, Mr. Ockey's sister, testified that Mr. Ockey knew every 
aspect of the development of the Ranch and State Lands. (R. TT:828-29.) 
• Hermione Bayas, Mr. Ockey's cousin, testified that Mr. Ockey knew others 
had invested in IMAI by 1994 at the latest. (R. TT:818.) 
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Far from being clearly erroneous, the trial court's finding that prior to June 1996 
Mr. Ockey knew (or should have known) other family members owned the IMAI stock is 
the only finding consistent with the evidence. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Ockey 
can maintain he did not know by June 1996 that the IMAI stock had gone to other family 
members—including his mother—when Mr. Ockey admits he urged his mother to 
become president of IMAI, which she did become in September 1995. Because 
Mr. Ockey knew of the facts underlying his conversion claims before June 1996, the 
concealment version of the equitable discovery rule does not apply. The Court should 
affirm the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Ockey's conversion claims for having been filed 
outside the three-year statute of limitations. 
2. There Is No Evidence Mr. Lehmer Concealed the 1993 Stock 
Transactions from Mr. Ockey. 
Mr. Ockey's attempt to invoke the concealment version of the discovery rule also 
fails because there is no evidence Mr. Lehmer, or anyone else, concealed the fact family 
members other than Mr. Ockey owned the IMAI stock. Far from concealing the IMAI 
stock transfers, Mr. Lehmer, along with John Condas and Uncle Nick, circulated minutes 
of a July 1, 1993 IMAI shareholders meeting describing precisely what they had done. 
(R. 4302.) Records such as these were kept at Uncle Nick's house, where Mr. Ockey was 
living, and Uncle Nick encouraged Mr. Ockey to go through them. (R. TT:292, 354-55.) 
Mr. Ockey's cousin and one-time co-plaintiff, Cathy Condas, testified that Mr. Ockey 
reviewed these documents to "keep himself fully informed."' (R. 3839.) 
With no evidence of concealment, Mr. Ockey cannot invoke the concealment 
version of the discovery rule. Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^25, 
108 P.3d 741 (the concealment version of the discovery requires that "a plaintiff does not 
become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or 
misleading conduct") (emphasis added). For this additional reason, the discovery rule 
424272 44 
cannot save Mr. Ockey's conversion claims. The Court should affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of Mr. Ockey's conversion claims as untimely under the statute of limitations. 
C. Mr. Ockey's Conversion and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Fail 
Because He Ratified the 1993 Stock Transfer by Failing to Object 
While Accepting More than $2 Million in Benefits. 
Mr. Ockey claims that IMAI should have distributed to him 13.89% of the IMAI 
stock delivered to Mr. Lehmer by R&J on June 30, 1993, and by failing to do so, 
Mr. Lehmer himself somehow converted the stock and breached his fiduciary duty to 
Mr. Ockey. Mr. Ockey's claim assumes that IMAI, let alone Mr. Lehmer, had an 
obligation to distribute the IMAI stock in proportion to ownership interest in the Ranch, 
even though Mr. Ockey never points to any authority requiring such a distribution. The 
only relevant documents were (i) the Option Agreement, in which Mr. Ockey agreed 
Mr. Lehmer was the "official recipient of all payments of Option Consideration and all 
notices under the Option Agreement;" and (ii) the power of attorney, in which Mr. Ockey 
gave Mr. Lehmer the authority "to act on my behalf in all matters requiring my consent, 
cooperation, or assistance under the Option [Agreement]/' (R. 3288; 3452; 4594-96; 
TT:90, 115.) Neither of these documents obligated IMAI to make any particular 
distribution of the stock when it was delivered to Mr. Lehmer by R&J. 
Assuming IMAI did have an obligation to deliver 13.89% of the stock to 
Mr. Ockey on June 30, 1993, Mr. Lehmer fulfilled any fiduciary duty he had to 
Mr. Ockey by first consulting with Uncle Nick before proceeding. Uncle Nick 
represented to Mr. Lehmer that he had the consent of the entire family for cancellation of 
the IMAI stock as well as issuance of new stock to raise funds to make payments under 
the State Lease. (R. 4294-95.) In the opening brief, Mr. Ockey argues Uncle Nick's 
representation was both irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay (as Uncle Nick died before 
he could be deposed), and therefore Uncle Nick's statements cannot be used to show 
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Mr. Lehmer discharged his fiduciary duty. (Opening Brief at 26-31.) However, because 
Uncle Nick's practice was to gather family consent, it was reasonable for Mr. Lehmer to 
rely upon Uncle Nick's representation that he had gathered family consent, whether it 
was true or not. Uncle Nick's statement was plainly relevant and was not hearsay 
because it was not offered for its truth, but instead merely to show Mr. Lehmer's state of 
mind when deciding what to do with the IMAI stock. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (defining 
"hearsay" as an out-of-court statement "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted"). Mr. Lehmer did not breach his fiduciary duty to Mr. Ockey because he 
used the proper channels of communication to obtain authority for his actions.14 
In any event, Mr. Ockey ratified IMAI's decision to cancel the stock, issue new 
stock, and raise funds sufficient to make the payments then past-due under the State 
Lease. Under Utah law, "subsequent affirmance by a principal of a contract made on his 
behalf by one who had at the time neither actual nor apparent authority constitutes a 
ratification, which in general is as effectual as an original authorization." Moses v. 
13
 Mr. Ockey's hearsay argument fails for another reason. In the opening brief, Mr. 
Ockey cites only to passages in Mr. Lehmer's motion in limine to allow testimony 
concerning what Uncle Nick told Mr. Lehmer. (Opening Brief at 26-27.) Without 
explanation, Mr. Ockey does not cite to trial testimony to which Mr. Ockey objected, and 
on which the trial court ruled. However, it is only trial testimony that even could have 
formed the basis of the trial court's factual findings. Mr. Ockey provides no connection 
between Mr. Lehmer's motion in limine, which apparently was never even ruled upon, 
and the trial court's factual findings, which embody the evidence relevant to the rulings 
Mr. Ockey is challenging on appeal. By failing to cite to specific objections in the trial 
transcript, Mr. Ockey failed to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 
TJ42, 114 P.3d 551 (a party waived "evidentiary arguments because he did not properly 
preserve his objections below and has failed to argue plain error or demonstrate 
exceptional circumstances justifying appellate review"). 
14
 Again, if anyone caused Mr. Ockey not to receive the IMAI stock, it was not Mr. 
Lehmer but Uncle Nick, who had apparent authority from every family member to 
communicate their consent to a course of action. Mr. Lehmer merely relied upon this 
apparent authority. See Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 208-09 (Utah 
1993) ("even though an agent's act is not actually authorized by the principal, the 
principal may nevertheless be liable to a third party based on the doctrine of apparent 
authority," which consists of "conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, 
causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his 
behalf by the person purporting to act for him"). 
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Archie McFarland & Son, 119 Utah 602, 607, 230 P.2d 571, 573 (1951). A principal 
ratifies an unauthorized agreement if the principal has "the knowledge of all material 
facts and . . . an express or implied intention . . . to ratify." Bullock v. Utah, 966 P.2d 
1215, 1218 (Utah App. 1998). "Any conduct which indicates assent by the purported 
principal to become a party to the transaction or which is justifiable only if there is 
ratification is sufficient. Even silence with full knowledge of the facts may manifest 
affirmance and thus operate as a ratification." Moses, 230 P.2d at 573-74. 
In Bullock, the plaintiff sued his partners for selling partnership property because, 
he claimed, he had not given consent to sell his interest in the property. 966 P.2d at 1216. 
By the time of the suit, however, the plaintiff had received and cashed a check for his 
share of the sales proceeds. Id, Because the plaintiff "endorsed and negotiated the check 
and took no other action," the court held that "even under the heightened standard 
applicable to summary judgment... the trial court was correct in finding that [plaintiff] 
had ratified the contract." Id at 1220. By accepting benefits stemming from an 
unauthorized transaction after learning of the transaction, one ratifies the transaction. 
In the 1998 Settlement Agreement—which was signed well after Mr. Ockey first 
filed his complaint alleging conversion and breach of fiduciary duty—Mr. Ockey ensured 
he would continue to reap millions of dollars in benefits from the development of the 
Colony, a development (i) involving both the Ranch and the State Lands and (ii) made 
possible by Mr. Lehmer maintaining the State Lease in 1993. On June 30, 1993, the only 
asset owned by IMAI was the State Lease, and at the time the IMAI stock was delivered 
to Mr. Lehmer, a $6,000 lease payment was past due. (R. 4596.) The State Lease was 
important to development of the Ranch because the State Lands were interspersed within 
the Ranch, and therefore IMAI needed to raise funds quickly to make the payment under 
the State Lease, which it did by issuing 6,000 shares for $1 per share. (R. 4595-96.) 
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Had IMAI simply distributed the stock in proportion to ownership interest in the 
Ranch—as Mr. Ockey claims—it could not have raised the $6,000 needed to maintain the 
State Lease, and the State Lands could not have been coupled with the Ranch for 
development. (R. 4597.) The State Lands benefited every lessor—including 
Mr. Ockey—by increasing the development value of the Ranch, and thus by securing and 
maintaining the State Lease with the funds raised by selling IMAI stock, IMAI was 
acting to the benefit of all lessors under the Option Agreement.15 (R. 4597.) 
As the trial court found, "ownership of the State Lease added value to the 
development of the Ranch and ultimately allowed for the purchase by IMAI of the State 
[Lands], 505 acres, and an additional 410 acres that became part of the Ranch 
development," thereby causing "the family real estate development to become much 
more valuable." (R. 4601.) Mr. Ockey does not challenge this factual finding as clearly 
erroneous, but nonetheless asserts that "[cancelling Ockey's stock did nothing to benefit 
Ockey," and that the benefits he "received from development of the Ranch . . . would 
have been received regardless of whether his stock improperly canceled." (Opening 
Brief 25-26.) The evidence indicates just the opposite: without the State Lands the 
development would have been much less valuable, as the developers would have had to 
work with non-contiguous land. Because sale of the IMAI stock to maintain the State 
Leases benefited Mr. Ockey as a part owner of the Ranch, by accepting these benefits 
after knowing of the IMAI stock transfers, Mr. Ockey ratified the transfers and thereby 
waived any claim he had against Mr. Lehmer. For this additional reason, Mr. Ockey's 
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims fail. The Court should affirm. 
15
 This fact also shows that Mr. Lehmer did not breach his fiduciary duty to Mr. Ockey in 
the first place, but instead acted to benefit Mr. Ockey. Yet Mr. Ockey maintains that he 
was somehow harmed when IMAI sold stock to maintain the State Lease, which 
increased the value of the Ranch to the benefit of Mr. Ockey. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ockey's quiet title claims fail for at least five reasons, (i) Mr. Lehmer has 
never claimed title to the Ranch Interest, and therefore, there is no controversy for the 
Court to resolve; (ii) Mr. Ockey transferred his interest to OK Investments prior to 1998, 
and therefore, Mr. Ockey had no standing to bring his claims; (iii) Mr. Ockey agreed in 
the 1998 Settlement Agreement that another company, IMALLC, would keep title to the 
Ranch no matter the outcome of this case, and therefore, the claims are moot; (iv) 
Mr. Ockey was not entitled to a portion of the Ranch under the Trusts, and therefore, he 
had no claim to title to begin with; and (v) Mr. Ockey ratified any defect in the transfer of 
whatever interest he had in the Ranch by accepting millions of dollars in benefits made 
possible by the transfer. Mr. Lehmer has never claimed title; and Mr. Ockey never had 
title, transferred whatever interest he had to one company, and waived whatever title 
claim he had in favor of another company, all while reaping benefits to the tune of over 
$2 million for what he claims was a defective transfer of title. Mr. Lehmer never should 
have had to defend against the quiet title claims in 2001, and Mr. Ockey has no good-
faith basis to reassert them against Mr. Lehmer on appeal. The Court should affirm the 
dismissal of the quiet title claims. 
Mr. Ockey's conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims fair no better. The 
sole remedy Mr. Ockey seeks—return of IMAI stock—is unavailable as to Mr. Lehmer 
under Mr. Ockey's own theory. Mr. Ockey dismissed the two defendants who would 
have his stock under his own theory. Mr. Ockey also admits that Mr. Lehmer received 
less stock as a result of the transactions Mr. Ockey challenges, and therefore, Mr. Lehmer 
cannot have the stock Mr. Ockey seeks. Finally, Mr. Ockey cannot recover stock much 
more valuable than it was when he first discovered the basis of his claims, especially 
where Mr. Ockey waived his right to damages because the amount was too low. 
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In addition to Mr. Ockey waiving the only remedy available to him and dismissing 
the only defendants from which he could recover it, his conversion claims were untimely. 
Mr. Ockey invokes the discovery rule but fails to marshal the evidence demonstrating 
that he knew in 1995 that others owned IMAI stock, well before the three-year statute of 
limitations had run. Finally, Mr. Ockey ratified the IMAI stock distribution by accepting 
millions of dollars in benefits the distribution made possible. Because the distribution 
Mr. Ockey finds objectionable was crucial to the development—a development from 
which Mr. Ockey accepted profits totaling millions of dollars—his knowledge of the 
alleged conversion coupled with his acceptance of the benefits stemming from it serve as 
a ratification of any alleged wrongdoing. For all of these reasons, the Court should 
affirm the dismissal of Mr. Ockey's conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
Because the litany issues Mr. Ockey raises on appeal are defective on so many 
grounds, Mr. Lehmer requests under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
that the Court award him costs and attorney fees, as Mr. Ockey's appeal appears to be 
designed simply to prolong his lawsuit against Mr. Lehmer and cause Mr. Lehmer as 
much expense as possible. Mr. Lehmer also requests that the Court award him attorney 
fees and costs as the prevailing party, just as the trial court did below. (R. 4612-14, 4728, 
4747); R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, [^27, 40 P.3d 1119 (awarded fees to 
prevailing party). Regardless, the Court should affirm and end this nine-year saga. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2007. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
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